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 In this brief essay, I shall argue that the answer to this question is “No.” The notion that 
“dropped equals conceded” reflects a well-intentioned norm against intervention which is 
embodied in the tabula rasa metaphor of adjudication. However, accepted as an absolute rule, it 
favors quantity over quality (i.e,. speed), reduces debate to “ink on the flow” instead of 
arguments weighed in the mind, and distorts our understanding of what actually happens in 
debates. In its place, I propose a norm which proceeds from an alternative formulation of 
adjudication. It is only when an uncontested argument passes prima facie tests that it should be 
considered conceded. The new norm I propose extends McGee's (1998) stance of “least 
intervention” into the terrain of prima facie intervention.  
 To establish prima facie intervention, this essay proceeds in four sections. First, “silence 
is consent” is positioned as a well-intentioned but problematic norm. Second, this norm is 
connected to the tabula rasa metaphor of adjudication. Third, Brian McGee’s “least intervention” 
is considered as an improvement over tabula rasa. Fourth, prima facie intervention is suggested 
as new metaparadigm allowing for the overturning of the present unfortunate convention 
regarding dropped arguments.  
 
The Norm  
 
Our question is not, “Is a dropped argument a conceded argument?”, because we are not 
speaking of a matter of logical necessity or official fiat rules of debate organizations. The 
seeming unquestionability of the notion that “dropped equals conceded” loses its air of apparent 
axiomatic authority when it is recognized for what it is, a norm. The official rules of debating 
organizations are sparse and make no pronouncements on such matters. Outside the debating 
chamber there are many contexts where this norm has no force. In most substantive debates, 
judges of an argument will not simply accede to it merely because it was unopposed by the 
opposition. An argument must be sound to command assent, regardless of opposition. 
The norm is intuitively appealing in the context of educational debate, in which it is 
widely recognized that the goal is to determine which side did the better job of debating and not 
the actual truth-value of the proposition. This sentiment is repeated in North American debate 
textbooks over the last century. O’Neill, Laycock, and Scales (1917) remark, “the decision 
should go always on the skill of the debaters, never on the strength of the case (except in so far 
as this is indicative of the skill of the debaters)” (p. 53). Freeley (1961) states that, “in 
educational debate the judge is instructed to disregard the merits of the proposition and to render 
the decision on the merits of the debate and-the purpose of the debate is to provide educational 
opportunities for the participants” (p. 293). 
Although the educational commitments of North American academic debate are 
longstanding, it is difficult to state with any precision when a strong norm regarding dropped 
arguments surfaced in the collective consciousness of the debate community. On face, failing to 
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address arguments made by the opposition is not good practice, but it is not clear when this 
obvious truism reduced to a bumper-sticker-style normative equation (e.g., “dropped equals 
conceded,” “silence means consent”). There is certainly talk of dropped arguments in the 1960s. 
The third edition of Freeley’s (1971) Argumentation and Debate, for example, features a final 
round transcript of a debate on the 1967 NDT proposition in which the debaters frequently refer 
to arguments dropped by the other team:  
Secondly, we say it fails to integrate them into our economy.  The gentlemen dropped the 
argument. Finally, in terms of efficiency, we told you we were comparing in kind with 
cash. The gentlemen dropped that argument as well. The important point is they never 
discussed that.  
(p. 485) 
Move forward in time and one finds characterizations of dropped arguments to be more along the 
lines of a rule. The twelfth edition of Argumentation and Debate offers a transcript of the 1995 
CEDA final round where it is apparent that arguments about dropped arguments now fall under 
the “silence mean consent” convention:  
 The NMFS is part of the executive branch and I read the specific link evidence in the 
2NC that says that executive [ONE AND A HALF] branch rule-making empirically has 
angered Congress. He doesn’t answer this. Also, the whole story about the current 
compromise on executive rule-making is dropped. Conceded. The 2AR can’t talk about it. 
(Freeley & Steinberg, 2009, p. 436)    
The strong norm about dropped arguments, of course, entered the picture before the 1995 final 
CEDA round. Leef (2008) claims that the convention emerged in the late 1970s, which would be 




 Between the longstanding goal of education and the more recent norm of “dropped is 
conceded” stands an image which connects the two, the judge as a blank slate waiting to be 
written upon. The judge under this ideal image does not bring in any personal prejudice, beliefs, 
or knowledge into the round. Imagined as a purely passive entity, the judge is merely there to 
report who won the debate, to bear witness to self-evident events.  
About a half-century ago, Drum (1968) invoked another metaphor to complain that the 
expectation that a judge must dutifully take notes of all the proceedings of a round was 
dehumanizing:  
The American debater is trained to look upon the debate judge as a machine, a machine 
which copies down every bit of evidence and then, much in the manner of Eniac or 
Univac, ticks forth a deductive decision. And be it noted that, like the mechanical 
computer, the judge is supposed to have no emotions, no biases, no feelings, on the 
matter, and, in fact, no memory. (pp. 348-349)  
Under the tabula rasa metaphor, however, matters are worse than that of judge-as-computer; 
slates do not even perform computations. The tabula rasa metaphor is not computational, 
implying arguments somehow sort themselves out interpretively and evaluatively in the process 
of being inscribed.  
Indeed, given the idealized passivity of the judge in this metaphor, it is more appropriate 
to describe the debate as happening on “the flow.” The “blank slate” is really the legal pad or 
computer screen. Anything in the judge’s head is out-of-bounds and the judge should compliantly 
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mediate translating speech into writing. The judge is not a person to be persuaded, but merely a 
planchette or stenographer.    
 Although many textbooks refer to tabula rasa as a ground-level paradigm on all fours 
alongside other paradigms such as “policy-maker” and “hypothesis testing” (e.g., Freeley & 
Steinberg, 2009; Hanes, 2015), I agree with Berube, Snider, and Pray that “tabula rasa” is 
properly classified at a higher level of abstraction. Berube, Snider, and Pray (1994) position 
tabula rasa and judge intervention as two foundationally opposed metaparadigms which are 
compatible with various paradigmatic metaphors of judging. One can, for example, claim to be 
both tabula rasan and a hypothesis tester. This conceptual distinction is supported by Dudzak and 
Day’s (1990) empirical study of judging paradigms which found that tabula rasa “merged with 
all other paradigms except Stock Issues on five of seven discriminants” (p. 22). 
 This finding is not surprising, given the widespread rejection of intervention. West’s 
(2007) textbook on parliamentary debate, for example, offers a familiar denunciation: “The 
debaters have to debate each other; they should not have to debate their judge” (p. 14). Berube, 
Snider, and Pray’s conceptualization of tabula rasa and intervention as metaparadigms offers a 
stark either/or choice, making tabula rasa appear to be the only respectable choice.      
 The rub is that while tabula rasa offers as a simple idealization of the judge, it is quite 
impossible to achieve in actual practice. Champions of the tabula rasa perspective (e.g., Urlich, 
1992; West, 2007) acknowledge that it is an unachievable ideal, but still advocate for it as a goal, 
in much the same way that journalists are supposed to strive for objectivity: “Obviously, it is not 
always possible to keep one’s beliefs separate from a decision, but judges have an obligation to 
debaters to try” (West, 2007, p. 14). McGee (1998) remarks, “In one way or another, tabula rasa 
proponents always have reverted to defending less rather than more intervention in the decision-
making process, rather than defending some unattainable state of absolute non-intervention” (p. 
47).  
 Even so, a blank slate is still more appealing than the image of the interventionist judge. 
If the blank slate is the unreachable asymptote of adjudicator virtue, intervention would seem to 
the bottomless abyss of adjudicator tyranny. Arguing for intervention would seem to be like 
arguing for cancer or heart disease. A similar trouble besets the study of ethics. Given the choice 
between moral relativism or unyielding absolutism, it seems better to be a relativist. If, however, 





It is along these lines, that McGee would argue that we should let go of the metaphor of 
the blank slate and commit to a middle position he describes as “least intervention.” In his essay, 
McGee (1998) builds off of prior criticism of the tabula rasa paradigm, notably by Bunch (1994), 
and articulates three varieties of judge intervention. Sense-making intervention is that of the 
judge using outside beliefs and information to give meaning to utterances made by debaters: 
“Judges must make sense of the debates in which they participate, and their attempts to do so are 
a kind of ‘intervention’ into the debate” (McGee, 1998, p. 43). Evaluative intervention is that of 
assessing the quality of arguments in terms of the judge’s understanding of argument theory, 
even if quality of argument is not raised by the competitors. Where evaluative intervention is 
formal, content-based intervention is substantive. Curiously, McGee (1998) contends that this not 
only involves the judge’s position on evidence in the round, but also their “skepticism about 
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specific argument types” (p. 46).   
Simply put, McGee’s position is what it sounds like; the judge should only intervene as 
much as is necessary to make adjudication of the round possible. Sense-making intervention is 
acceptable, but evaluative and content-based intervention are only allowable in the rarest of 
circumstances. In articulating a middle-ground position between fictional erasure of the critic 
and the total imposition of the judge into the round “least intervention” was an important step 
forward.  
There are, however, limitations to the position. First, the notion that there is a clear 
delineation between sense-making and evaluation is unrealistic. The interpretive process is also 
an evaluative one. The interpretive “Principle of Charity,” for example, involves reading 
speakers’ statements in a way that makes them rational and puts them in the strongest possible 
light. Doing this requires the evaluation of better and worse, stronger and weaker. As much as 
tabula rasa is an unrealistic metaphor of adjudication, so too is the notion that judges might 
intervene only to make sense of arguments. In truth, we’re always “intervening” in making sense 
out of and assessing the world we find around us.  
More importantly, I contend that least intervention attempts to limit the role of the judge 
too much. McGee flinches in approaching the middle ground for fear of sliding down a slippery 
slope. In a footnote answering a reviewer’s question regarding intervention to reject hate speech 
McGee (1998) attempts to reassure his reader that least intervention, “places a heavy 
presumption against evaluative and content-based intervention” and does not “open the door” for 
activist judges (p. 51). Unfortunately, least intervention, as McGee articulates it, allows for 
student competitors to game normative predispositions against intervention with bad arguments 
that must stand as good unless and until the other side addresses them. If the judge still has to 
pretend to be a fool with no good judgment in the face of bad arguments, they effectively are still 
handcuffed to the tabula rasa metaparadigm.  
 
Prima Facie  
 
I propose extending least intervention to more realistically reflect what actually happens 
in debate rounds and to free debate rounds from the ridiculous convention that silence on any 
argument in a debate is a concession of that argument. What I am calling for amounts to using 
the same standard we apply to the affirmative case to individual arguments in the round. 
Specifically, uncontested arguments should be subjected to a minimal prima facie test read under 
the principle of charitable reading to determine if that argument should be included in 
adjudication. If the argument is included after passing the prima facie test, the judge should then 
refrain, as much as possible, from further intervention on that issue.   
Consider that the requirement that the affirmative offer a prima facie case already 
requires judge intervention by longstanding convention. Kruger (1960) a clear and typical 
reading of the prima facie requirement:  
In debate, failure by the affirmative to prove the debate resolution (to be probably true) 
obliges a judge to vote for the negative. Because of the initial presumption favoring the 
negative, the affirmative must initially present what is known as a prima facie case, that 
is, a case which on the face of it proves, or appears to prove, the resolution (to be 
probably true). The negative then has the obligation of showing, by one means or another, 
that the affirmative has failed to prove the resolution (to be probably true). (p. 127) 
The requirement that the resolution be proved “on the face of it” requires a preliminary 
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evaluation by the critic before the negative even speaks. Moreover, a case is made up of 
individual arguments, which means that the critic must evaluate the constituent arguments of the 
case before the negative offers their advocacy.  If all of this is already acceptable, then so too 
should be the notion that judges would engage in an initial evaluative intervention of an 
argument to determine if it would stand without refutation.   
Prima facie intervention does not replace least intervention, so much as it redefines it. I 
offer no call here for either for reckless intrusion into the round or pious denial of judge’s actual 
participation in the event. If an argument passes the prima facie test, then like the prima facie 
case, it becomes the responsibility of the opposition to refute it. The judge properly has no 
further stake in the matter.     
Moreover, uncontested arguments should be read under the principle of charity. Judges 
should actively interpret the argument so as to render it as rational and persuasive. The 
enthymematic nature of argument makes this charity complicated. Should a judge assume a 
suppressed or implied warrant if one is not explicitly mentioned? If someone says, for example, 
“I had a look outside and you should take your umbrella” it seems natural to assume precipitation 
is likely or occurring and that taking the umbrella is being encouraged as protection against the 
elements. This might be wrong. There might be an umbrella collector paying top dollar. We 
should note in this example the assumed supplemental information springs naturally to mind and 
requires no strain. A competent user of the English language under normal circumstances and no 
additional information would arrive at the same conclusion. So too should it go for uncontested 
arguments. Judges should inferring suppressed premises when reasonable. There is no simple 
mechanistic rule for how to do this, which is precisely why we turn to human judges in the first 
place.  
Perhaps this is where I flinch, erring on the side of caution and allowing the occasional 
bad argument to stand because of an over-charitable reading. Prima facie intervention is, 
however, more realistic and more of a corrective than least intervention. It stands within 
preexisting conventional parameters of prima facie requirements, so it is less radical than it 
might initially sound. It allows us to acknowledge the educational goals of debate without 
cashing out for impossible metaphors of emptiness, but also provides a mean by which we may 
transcend the thudding convention that “silence means consent.”       
 
References  
Berube, D. M., Snider, A.C., & Pray, K. (1994). Non-policy Debating. Lanham, MD: University  
Press of America.   
Bunch, A. (1994). Beyond tabula rasa. Argumentation and Advocacy, 30, 174-181.  
Drum, D. D. (1968). The debate judge as a machine. In A. N. Kruger (Ed.), Counterpoint:  
Debates about debate (pp. 345-356). Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press.     
Dudczak, C. A., & Day, D. (1990, November). The impact of paradigm consistency on  
taxonomic boundaries in CEDA debate. Paper presented at the 76th Annual Meeting of 
the Speech Communication Association, Chicago, IL. http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED328925 
Freeley, A. J. (1961). Argumentation and debate: Rational decision making. San Francisco,  
CA: Wadsworth.  
Freeley, A. J. (1971). Argumentation and debate: Rational decision making (3rd ed.). San  
Francisco, CA: Wadsworth.  
Freeley, A. J., & Steinberg, D. L. (2009). Argumentation and debate: Critical thinking for  
reasoned decision making. Boston, MA: Wadsworth.   
5
Clark: Should a Dropped Argument Always be Treated as a Conceded Argumen
Published by Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and Information Exchange, 2016
Discourse Vol. 3, Fall 2016   15 
 
Hanes, T. R. (2015). The “how to” of debate: Skills and theories for policy debate. Raleigh, NC:  
Lulu.  
Kruger, A. N. (1960). Modern debate: Its logic and strategy. New York, NY: McGraw Hill.  
Leef, G. (2008). College debate ain’t what it used to be. Retrieved from  
http://www.popecenter.org/2008/12/college-debate-aint-what-it-used-to-be/ 
McGee, B.R. (1998). Judgment after tabula rasa: Defending “Least Intervention.” Contemporary  
Argumentation and Debate, 19, 40-57.  
O’Neill, J. M., Laycock, C., & Scales, R.K. (1917). Argumentation and debate. New York, NY:  
MacMillan.  
Urlich, W. (1992). In search of tabula rasa. In D. A. Thomas and J. P. Hart (Eds.), Advanced  
debate: Readings in the theory, practice, & teaching (pp. 310-318). Chicago, IL: National 
Textbook Company.  





Discourse: The Journal of the SCASD, Vol. 3 [2016], Art. 3
https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/discoursejournal/vol3/iss1/3
